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Abstract
This research aims to examine the moderating effect of the cost of earnings management on
the relationship between earnings management and future earnings. The research samples
are manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013-2015, the cost
of accruals earnings management is auditor quality, and costs of real earnings management
are market share and financial health. Based on the fixed effect regression test, auditor
quality strengthens the positive effect of accruals earnings management on future
performance, while market share and financial health weaken the negative effect of real
earnings management on future earnings. This indicates that in the context of efficient
contracting, a high quality auditor provides a better signal for earnings prediction
compared to a low quality auditor. In addition, higher market share and higher financial
health limit opportunistic real earnings management in reducing future earnings.
Keywords: earnings management, cost of earnings management, future earnings,
opportunist, signaling

Abstrak
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji efek pemoderasi biaya manajemen laba terhadap
hubungan antara management laba dan laba masa depan. Sampel penelitian yaitu perusahaan
manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia 2013-2015. Biaya manajamen laba
akrual yaitu kualitas auditor, sedangkan biaya manajemen laba riil yaitu pangsa pasar dan
kesehatan keuangan. Berdasarkan uji regresi fixed effect, kualitas auditor memperkuat
pengaruh positif manajemen laba akrual terhadap laba masa depan, sementara pangsa pasar
dan kesehatan keuangan memperlemah pengaruh negatif manajemen laba riil terhadap laba
masa depan. Hal tersebut mengindikasikan bahwa dalam konteks efisien, auditor berkualitas
tinggi membuat manajemen laba akrual memberi sinyal yang lebih kuat untuk memprediksi
laba masa depan dibandingkan dengan auditor berkualitas rendah. Pangsa pasar dan
kesehatan keuangan yang lebih tinggi membatasi praktik manajemen laba riil oportunis yang
menurunkan laba masa depan.
Kata kunci: manajemen laba, biaya manajemen laba, laba masa depan, oportunis,
pensinyalan

INTRODUCTION
Earnings management can be
classified into two categories, namely
Accruals Earnings Management (hereafter
AEM) and Real Earnings Management
(hereafter REM). AEM means to manage
earnings through the utilization of
accounting principles provided by GAAP,

whereas REM is accelerating earnings by
changing
some
business
activities
(Roychowdhury 2006). AEM is not
accomplished by changing the underlying
operating activities of the company, but
through the choices of accounting methods
and accounting estimations used to represent those activities; while REM involves
changing the company’s underlying
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operations in an effort to boost currentperiod earnings (Gunny 2010).
Earnings management relates to
performance evaluation. It is important to
examine how management performance
will be, especially earnings, after earnings
management is carried out in the future.
This research focuses on the effect of
earnings management on future earnings.
Enron was declared bankrupt in 2002 for
earnings manipulation and covering up its
financial problems and losses (Shirur
2011). The case of Enron demonstrates that
the evaluation of future performance is
important to avoid the negative impact of
earnings management.
Previous research have provided
inconsistent results regarding the effect of
earnings management on future earnings.
Some past studies have shown that both
AEM and REM have a negative effect on
future earnings (Cohen and Zarowin 2010;
Filip et al. 2015; Leggett et al. 2015; Vorst
2016; Tabassum et al. 2014). Earnings
management can decrease future earnings
because earnings management, especially
REM, can create problems in the future
(Tabassum et al. 2014; Leggett et al. 2015).
These problems include a decrease of
future sales volume caused by the current
discounted price (a method of sales manipulation) that will be changed back to the
normal price in the future (Roychowdhury
2006), a decrease of future receivables
collectability caused by lean current credit
sales (a method of sales manipulation)
(Roychowdhury 2006), or the experience of
investment opportunity losses of potential
future sales caused by RnD expense cutting
(a method of discretionary expenses
reduction) (Vorst 2016).
On another note, some previous
studies have shown that both AEM and
REM can serve as information signaling to
explain future earnings (Siregar and Utama
2009; Gunny 2010; Vorst 2016). Gunny
(2010) states that earnings management can
be a tool to show management ability in
order to generate higher earnings in the
future. Subramanyam (1996) strengthens
this argument by arguing that accrual

management helps earnings information by
reflecting economic value as well as
predicting future earnings.
Contrasting findings of earnings
management on future earnings exist
because there are two different motivations
when companies engage in earnings
management. These two different motivations generate two different effects of
earnings management on future earnings.
In opportunist motivation, both AEM and
REM are used to generate misleading
information, so that it increases information
cost (the cost needed to generate high
quality
and
accurate
information)
(Nuryaman 2013), as well as the loss of
investment opportunity caused by R&D
reduction that leads to lost potential future
sales improvement (Vorst 2016), even
going as far as decreasing subsequent performance (Filip et al. 2015) due to lower
subsequent sales. In efficient contract motivation, earnings management is used to
share the private information on the
companies’ quality in order to differentiate
them from low quality companies (Kirmani
dan Rao, 2000); such information regarding
management ability may generate future
performance (Gunny 2010), thus may be
able assist in predicting future earnings
(Nuryaman 2013).
Inconsistent research results on
earnings management is caused by unclear
motivations,
whether
the
earnings
management was conducted due to opportunist behavior motivation or an efficient
contracting
one
(Suhardianto
and
Harymawan 2011). Efficient contracting
refers to earnings management done to
provide signals related to a company’s true
economic performance by using their
private information, while opportunist
earnings management refers to information
manipulation that reflects more on the
manager’s personal desire rather than the
company's financial performance (Wuryani
2012). This research utilizes the cost of
earnings management in order to explain
whether earnings management tends to be
an opportunist act or serve as information
signaling. The cost of earning management
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is the limitations and barriers for a manager
to engage in earnings management (Beyer
et al. 2018; Abernathy et al. 2014). If a
manager bears the higher cost of earnings
management, then the manager is less
likely to engage in it; however, if a
manager bears the lower cost of earnings
management, then the manager is more
likely to engage in it (Beyer et al. 2018).
Beyer et al. (2018) explain that it is costly
to give a credible signal of private
information so companies should have the
ability to pay the costs to provide credible
signal of information. In this research
context, companies should have the ability
to maintain the cost of earnings
management in order to give the signal of
private information.
Badertscher (2011) states that there
are costs companies must consider in
choosing AEM over REM, or REM over
AEM. Zang (2012) specifically points out
the cost of both AEM and REM. The cost
of AEM is audit quality, while the costs of
REM are market share and financial health
(Zang 2012). Zang (2012) finds that a high
quality auditor is a limitation and barrier
for a company to implement AEM, while a
company’s lower market share and
financial health are limitations and barriers
for carrying out REM.
Zehri and Shabou (2011) find that a
high quality auditor decreases opportunist
AEM because they have the ability to
detect opportunist AEM compared to a low
quality auditor. The main role of an auditor
is to ensure that the financial statement
stated is based on accounting standards
(IAPI 2015), as well as reducing the
possibility of weak accounting standards
such as the engagement of opportunist
AEM. Auditor quality is not a cost for
REM because REM does not utilize
weaknesses in accounting standards to
manage earnings, but rather change a
number of business activities. Companies
implement REM to avoid the auditor’s
scrutiny (Cohen et al. 2008; Roychowdhury
2006).
Mascarenhas et al. (2010) argues that
an auditor has the motivation to increase
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the AEM of information signaling; this
corresponds
to
the
findings
of
Subramanyam (1996), where the AEM of
information
signaling
is
positively
responded by the investor, therefore the
auditor has the interest of the investor's
positive response in mind. An investor's
positive response indicates that financial
information which has been audited by an
auditor is considered to be of high quality
and that the auditors have succeeded in
reducing asymmetric information. When an
auditor allows signaling AEM, it shows the
effective role they play in improving
information quality and reducing asymmetric information. An effective auditor
will gain a higher reputation, where higher
reputation can serve as motivation for
auditors to increase AEM signaling. The
reputation of auditors stems from their role
in providing high quality audit by
evaluating a company’s accounting policy
and estimation in predicting future
earnings. This will also enable financial
statement users to see the company’s
potential performance in the future. Since
signaling AEM refers to the accounting
policy and estimation choice to manage
current earnings that can give a signal of
future earnings, auditors will allow
companies to engage in signaling AEM so
they can achieve a higher reputation.
Signaling AEM is able to signal
informative current earnings to predict
future earnings if it is done under the
supervision of a high quality auditor.
Spence (1973) and Ross (1977)
explain that if companies want to enjoy the
benefit of signaling, the signal must be
credible, whereas credible signals have
proven to be costly. In the context of REM,
the costs of REM are market share and
financial health (Zang 2012).
Spence
(1973) and Ross (1977) explain that
signaling is costly, Zang (2012) further
elaborates that market share and financial
health can be used to explain if companies
engage in signaling REM. The higher the
market share and financial health, the lower
the costs of REM and the more REM is
implemented by the company (Zang 2012;
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Abernathy et al. 2014). REM is carried out
by changing the underlying company's
activities, hence the company needs to
make sure that they have competitive
advantages, such as market share and
financial health. Companies with higher
market share enjoy more competitive
advantages than followers due to their
greater cumulative experience, ability to
beneﬁt from economies of scale, bargaining
power with suppliers and customers,
attention from investors, and inﬂuence on
their competitors; so it will be easier for
them to deviate normal business activities
beyond their optimal point (Zang 2012). If
companies wish to deviate from normal
business activities, it will be easier for
companies with higher financial health
because companies with lower financial
health will bear more costs (Zang 2012).
In regard to efficient contracts,
Abernathy et al. (2014) states that the
purpose of REM is to improve operational
activities. REM can be used to change
business activities in order to reach optimal
level, such as generating more sales as well
as earnings in the current and future periods
(Gunny 2010). For example, if a company
is one of the market leaders with a high
market share, REM will be carried out by
providing a temporary discounted price
without any worries of sales decreasing in
the future due to the change from the
discounted price back to the normal price.
They will maintain higher sales in the
future because of a market leader’s
competitive advantage compared to
followers due to their greater cumulative
experience, ability to beneﬁt from
economies of scale, as well as the
bargaining power they have with suppliers
and customers. Moreover, they can use
discounted price strategies to introduce new
products to new customers, in addition to
gaining a new market and generating more
sales in the future. In order to achieve the
optimal level of business activities,
companies should have high market share
and financial health. REM will prove to be
costly in improving operational activities if
the company has a low market share and

poor financial health. REM will be able to
signal the improvement of operation
activities and help to predict future
earnings if done by a company with high
market share and good financial health.
This research aims to examine: (1)
the moderating effect of auditor quality on
the effect of AEM on future earnings; and
(2) the moderating effect of market share
and financial health on the effect of REM
on future earnings. This research serves as
a contribution to fill previous research gaps
that provide contrasting results between the
positive effect of earnings management on
future earnings (e.g. Gunny and Zhang
2014; Subramanyam 1996; Siregar and
Utama 2009; Beyer et al. 2018) and the
negative one (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin
2010; Filip et al. 2015; Leggett et al. 2015;
Vorst 2016; Tabassum et al. 2015) These
contrary results relate to the absence of
earnings management perspectives, which
are the opportunist behavior or efficient
contract perspectives. Previous research
(e.g.
Gunny
and
Zhang
2014;
Subramanyam 1996; Siregar and Utama
2009; Beyer et al. 2018; Cohen and Zarwin
2010; Filip et al. 2015; Leggett et al. 2015;
Vorst 2016; Tabassum et al. 2015) do not
include certain factors such as the
limitations of managers to engage in
earnings management, to explain when
earnings management has a positive effect
(as signaling earnings management) and
when it has a negative one (as opportunist
earnings management) on future earnings.
By not accounting for these factors, it is
unclear whether earnings management is
carried out based on opportunist behavior
or efficient contract to give the signal of
future earnings prediction. This research
fills the gap by using the cost of earnings
management as moderating variables to
determine if the effect of earning
management on future earnings is more
likely done by opportunist behavior or
information signaling. This research
predicts that opportunist earnings management is performed when companies have
lower costs of earnings management (low
quality auditors for AEM, lower market
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share and lower financial health for REM),
while information signaling is implemented
when companies have higher costs of
earnings management (high quality auditor
for AEM, higher market share and higher
financial health for REM).
LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Agency Theory
Agency theory explains the relationship between management and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The
main core of agency theory is about the
conflict of interest between management
and shareholders. Conflict exists because
there is asymmetric information between
management and shareholders. In the condition of larger asymmetric information,
management engages in opportunist behavior in order to fulfill their interests. Management engages in opportunist earnings
management to fulfill interests of bonus,
debt, and political cost (Scott 2019).
Signaling Theory
Companies know their own quality,
while external parties have less information
about it. Signaling theory explains that
companies need to give signal of the company’s quality in order to differentiate them
from low quality companies (Kirmani and
Rao 2000). Asymmetric information is the
main reason for companies to give signal of
private information to external parties. On
one hand, agency theory focuses on the impact of higher asymmetric information;
while on the other hand, signaling theory
focuses on the reduction of asymmetric information. Earnings management can be
viewed as a way for companies to give signal of future earnings to external parties.
Earnings Management
Earnings management are the alternatives used to manipulate reported earnings
to fulfill certain purposes. There are two
ways to understand earnings management.
First, earnings management as management
opportunist behavior maximizes their utili-
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ties in terms of face contract of compensation, debt, and political cost (Scott 2019).
Second, earnings management as an efficient contract perspective, where earnings
management gives management the flexibility to protect themselves and the company
in terms of anticipating unexpected events
for the benefit of related parties (Scott
2019). Earnings management is one of the
important issues in financial reporting because it is related to the information quality
of earnings (Dechow and Schrand 2004). In
Indonesia, research on earnings management have proven to be significant, contributing to 18 percent of all accounting and
finance research in the National Symposium of Accounting, as well as of 45.7 percent of all published research in the big five
accounting journals (Jurnal Akuntansi dan
Auditing Indonesia, Jurnal Akuntansi, Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Indonesia, Akuntabilitas, Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan) from
2000 until 2009 (Suhardianto and Harymawan 2011).
Earnings Management and Future Earnings
Earnings information is used to predict future earnings. Since earnings information that has been contaminated by earnings management is also used to predict
future earnings by information users, earnings management also has an effect on
future earnings prediction.
Previous studies have examined the
effect of earnings management on future
earnings. There are two contrast results
about the relationship between earnings
management and future earnings. In an efficient contract perspective, AEM (Lipe
1990; Subramanyam 1996; Simamora
2018; Siregar and Utama 2009) and REM
(Herbohn et al. 2010; Gunny 2010; Simamora 2018) have a positive effect on future
performance. Efficient earnings management gives the signal of private information, so earnings information users can
predict future earnings. In opportunist behavior, AEM (Nuryaman 2013) and REM
(Vorst 2016; Filip et al. 2015; Leggett et al.
2015) have a negative effect on earnings
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management. Opportunist behavior indicates that managers’ interests are above the
company's performance.
Earnings management, especially income smoothing, can also be used as a tool
to transfer future earnings to the current
earnings period. Hao and Yao (2010)
exeplain that companies will transfer second-period earnings to first period earnings through income smoothing if first
period earnings are low. This can be either
efficient or opportunist earnings management. It becomes efficient motivation if the
income smoothing is carried out by companies with higher stock liquidation or less
asymmetric information; while it becomes
opportunistic behavior if income smoothing
is done by companies with lower stock liquidation or more asymmetric information
(Hao and Yao 2010).
Since the prediction of future earnings is important for information users,
earnings forecasts plays an important role
on the prediction of future earnings. Investors use earnings forecast information to
predict future earnings. Earnings forecast
information are usually provided by a company’s management or analyst in the stock
market. Gunny and Zhang (2014) state that
earnings forecasts assist the investor in obtaining a signal of the company’s favorable
looks. Analyst forecast meetings are also a
company’s motivation to engage in earnings management, either for opportunistic
(Vorst 2016) or efficient motivation
(Gunny 2010; Beyer et al. 2018). This
research does not use earnings forecast beating as the motivation of earnings management to predict future earnings. This is because earnings forecast data is difficult to
access freely from either the companies'
management or analysts in the stock market.
Opportunistic Earnings Management
There are some opinions on earnings
management as opportunist behavior.
Schipper (1989) argues earnings management as opportunist behavior exists because
there is the intervention of management to
increase personal gain by misleading finan-

cial statement users. Schipper (1989) focuses on the behavior of misleading financial statement users as a crucial matter.
Since the personal gain of management can
be fulfilled in different ways, Healy and
Wahlen (1999) and Leuz et al. (2003) see
intention for personal gain of management
in a wider scope, which is the opportunist
and efficient motivation that depends on
how the personal gain of management is
fulfilled. This research views that opportunist earnings management is situational,
because there is evidence that companies
can implement earnings management either
from an opportunist or efficient contract
perspective (e.g. Al-Attar et al. 2008; Chen
et al. 2008; Simamora 2018; Hao and Yao
2010).
In terms of opportunist behavior, earnings management tends to cover the bad
condition of the company and creates a bad
effect in the future. Opportunist earnings
management is also done based on a bonus
scheme or debt covenant (Scott 2019).
Cohen et al. (2011) find investors recognize
the understatement of warranty liabilities in
order to manage earnings rather than communicate about performance and liability.
Irani and Oesch (2016) state that REM is
used to achieve short-term performance for
fulfilling analyst forecasts. Another opportunist earnings management is to cover bad
performance around seasoned equity offering (SEO) to boost up share price (Kothari
et al. 2016). Fisher et al. (2016) also find
that AEM is used to avoid filing for
bankruptcy in the United States.
Opportunist earnings management,
both AEM and REM, have negative effects
on future performance. AEM has a negative
effect on share price because earnings management practices can reduce the credibility of accounting information (Nuryaman
2013). Fisher et al. (2016) state that earnings management destroys economic value by making the distressed company look
like a healthy one. Vorst (2016) finds that
REM by discretionary investment cutting
leads to an opportunity lost of investment
and decreases subsequent performance.
Filip et al. (2015) find that AEM that
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avoids impairment loss recognition decreases future growth opportunities. REM
leads to larger real economic costs (Leggett
et al. 2015) and creates problems in the future (Tabassum et al. 2014). Companies
that beat analyst forecasts by using both
REM and AEM have worse operating performance and stock market performance in
the subsequent three years compared to
companies that miss analyst forecasts
without earnings management (Bhojraj et
al. 2009). The impacts of earnings management such as the decrease of economic
value, loss of investment opportunity, and
bigger economic cost show that earnings
management can decrease future earnings.
Efficient Earnings Management
Earnings management based on efficient contract or information signaling is
aimed at giving private information about
the competitive advantages of the company. Management uses earnings management as a tool to give a signal about management skills (Gunny 2010) and the company's ability to generate earnings or cash
flow in the future (Subramanyam 1996).
The main motive of management in using
earnings management as a signaling tool is
an efficient contract that provides a signal
of private information.
In terms of information signaling,
earnings management increases earnings
informativeness and predictability (Simamora 2018). Subramanyam (1996) finds
that managerial accrual discretion improves
the ability of earnings to reflect economic
value, as well as help and predict future
cash flows, earnings, and dividends. Since
accrual accounting base allows recording of
expenses in period of benefit rather than
period of cash outlay, it helps to predict
how much cash will flow in the next period, furthermore it can help to predict how
much earning can be generated in the next
period (Makar and Alam 2003). Lewellen
and Resutek (2019) explain accruals help
predict future earnings because they respond to change of production before the
change of production affect earnings (e.g.
change of the cost of goods sold can be
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predicted from the change of inventory cost
in the balance sheet), and helps to predict
earnings faster than revenue when investment takes times to give any returns.
Subramanyam (1996) finds evidence
consistent with this hypothesis, suggests
that discretionary accruals do add informational content to earnings. Lipe (1990)
shows that earnings management is a technique that reduces earnings variability to
reduce uncertainty and increases the predictability of future earnings. Al-Attar et al.
(2008) find that abnormal accruals could
predict future cash flow and suggests that
abnormal accruals are not merely the products of noise in the accruals-estimation
process. In this case, managers will use
earnings management to communicate
some private information to the public in
order to obtain results in the form of company value improvement (Tangjitprom
2013). Siregar and Utama (2009), as well
as Rezaei and Roshani (2012), find evidence that accrual earnings management is
an efficient purpose. Liu (2016) found that
there is a positive relationship between earnings management, both accrual and real
earnings management, and economic value
added in the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Herbohn et al.
(2010) suggest that management signal
their expectations about an improvement
(deterioration) in the future company’s performance via decreases (increases) in unrecognized deferred tax assets (losses).
Furthermore, Herbohn et al. (2010) found
evidence that management uses their
judgment to report useful, value-relevant
information about future profitability.
In terms of REM, abnormal activities
improve the ability of earnings to reflect
economic value as well, especially when a
firm has competitive advantage. For
example, a market leader firm enjoys more
competitive advantage than followers due
to greater cumulative experience, ability to
benefit from economies of scale, bargaining power with suppliers and customers,
attention from investors, and influence on
their competitors (Zang 2012). Therefore,
managers at market-leader firms may
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engage in REM to reflect the
competitiveness they have (Zang 2012).
Gunny (2010) found that REM has a
positive effect on future earnings. There are
two arguments of Gunny (2010). First, engaging in REM may provide benefits for
firms to perform better in the future. For
example, REM by selling fixed assets helps
a firm to avoid debt covenant, or by cutting
R&D expense to smooth earnings in order
to reduce cost of capital and obtain more
funding resources in the future (Gunny
2010). Second, the positive association
between REM and future performance is
also consistent with signaling managerial
competence or future performance. For
example, a credible firm issues management forecasting that shows the firm can
achieve better performance in the future but
fails to beat earnings benchmark in the current period, hence the firm engages in REM
to beat earnings benchmark and give signal
for better future performance (Gunny
2010). Vorst (2016) found that suspect
firms of REM (firms that meet earnings)
weaken the negative effect of REM through
discretionary investment cutting on future
earnings. Contrary to the opportunist concept, REM can serve as a signal of the
company’s ability to generate better earnings in the future (Gunny 2010).
As information signaling, earnings
management practices have to be followed
by a number of measurements in order to
distinguish earnings management as an opportunist act versus efficient motive, such
as auditor quality (Mascarenhas et al.
2010), bankruptcy risk (Al-Attar et al.
2008), and fundamental risk (Chen et al.
2008). Simamora (2018) finds that innate
factors and cost of REM can explain earnings management to increase earnings
predictability. Moreover, there are five innate factors determined by Francis et al.
(2005) that cause accruals management based on a firm’s business model: firm size,
operating cycle, operation cash flow variability, sales variability, and negative earnings (Simamora 2018). This research uses
auditor quality (cost of AEM), market share
(cost of REM), and financial health (cost of

REM) to find the likelihood of earnings
management as opportunist behavior or information signaling in future earnings prediction.
Hypotheses Development
Accrual Earnings Management, Future
Earnings, and Auditor Quality as the
Proxy of Cost of AEM
This research uses auditor quality in
order to separate AEM as opportunist behavior and information signaling. Mascarenhas et al. (2010) state that the auditor is
motivated to increase information signaling
AEM because Subramanyam (1996) finds
that information signaling AEM is
positively responded by the investor and
attracts the interest of the auditor. Even
though it is the manager’s motivation to
give the signal of private information, the
investor still needs an auditor as an independent party to ensure the quality of the
signal (Ojo 2015). A high quality auditor
ensures a high quality signal of private information provided by efficient motive earnings management. For example, when
management estimates low doubtful allowance, it is not always opportunistically for
covering up bad performance to obtain the
best compensation, but also giving the
signal that the company has good collecting
management and good payment profile
customers. High quality auditors will suggest where doubtful allowance can reflect
real receivable collection.
A quality measurement for an auditor
is auditor affiliation. A Big Four affiliated
auditor reduces opportunist AEM and
boosts signaling AEM up in order to maintain their reputation. Based on the deep
pocket theory, the Big Four auditors have
the biggest clients and revenue globally,
thus they are able to conduct training and
competence
improvement
investment
(Lennox 1999). DeAngelo (1981) finds that
a Big Four auditor can maintain independence because they reduce dependence on
certain clients. A high quality auditor reduces opportunist AEM and increase
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signaling in order to reduce monitoring
cost (Ching et al. 2015).
H1: Big Four auditors strengthens
(weakens) the positive (negative)
effect of AEM on future earnings.
Real Earnings Management, Future
Earnings, and Market Share as the Proxy
of Cost of REM
This research will use market share
and financial health in order to differentiate
REM as opportunist behavior and information signaling. Zang (2012) shows that
market share is the cost of REM. Zang
(2012) states that since REM is an
improvement strategy of optimal operational decisions, it can be particularly
costly for companies with lower market
share to face intense competition in the
industry. Therefore, management with a
lower percentage of industry market share
may perceive REM as more costly because
it can further erode their status within the
industry (Abernathy et al. 2014). Meanwhile higher market share companies have
the competitive advantages of greater
cumulative experience, the ability to benefit
from economies of scale, bargaining power
with suppliers and customers, attention
from investors, and influence on their
competitors (Zang 2012); lower market
share companies have a disadvantage in
their market position. The disadvantage of
market position leads to opportunist REM
(Markarian and Santalo´ 2014). Lower
market companies engage in REM through
carrying out sales through discounted price
or more lenient credit sales to cover up
their disability to generate more sales than
their competitors with a higher market
share. As a result, subsequent sales decrease because customers are less likely to
buy their product without any discounted
price, and receivable collectability decreases because lenient credit sales cannot
filter customers with good or bad
receivable payment (Roychowdhury 2006);
subsequent earnings will also further
decrease. Lower market share companies
cannot maintain higher sales in the future
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because they lack competitive advantages
like higher market share companies. This
shows that companies engaging in REM
without a higher market share will lead to
opportunist earnings management and a
decrease in future earnings. Higher market
share companies that engage in REM, such
as over sales, can still maintain higher
subsequent sales because they use REM as
a tool to give signal that they have greater
cumulative experience, the ability to benefit
from economies of scale, bargaining power
with suppliers and customers, attention
from investors, and influence on their
competitors. Companies with high market
share lead to high future earnings. High
market share will reduce bankruptcy risk
and increase companies’ performance
(Opler and Titman 1994) and stock market
value (Blundell et al. 1999), included in
future earnings. High market share
companies will take advantage of their
position as market leader to increase future
earnings by improving their operational
business to optimal level through REM. In
this case, REM is beneficial in giving
signal of competitive advantage for market
leader companies
to increase future
earnings.
H2: Market
share
strengthens
(weakens) the positive (negative)
effect of REM on future earnings.
Real Earnings Management, Future
Earnings, and Financial Health as the
Proxy of Cost of REM
Zang (2012) argues that financial
health is the cost of REM. High bankruptcy
risk leads to opportunist earnings management (Al-Attar et al. 2008; Fisher et al.
2016). For poorer financial health companies, the marginal cost of deviating from
optimal business strategies is likely to be
high (Zang 2012). Fisher et al. (2016)
explain that poorer financial health companies engage in earnings management to
cover up bad financial condition and to
avoid bankruptcy report filling. Different to
poorer financial health companies, higher
financial health companies engage in
earnings management as information
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Figure 1
Research Framework
Source: Hypotheses development and previous research

signaling, such as the signal of a healthy
financial condition. For example, when
companies experience overproduction, they
will face higher production costs as well.
Companies need to be in healthy financial
condition so that higher production costs do
not cause any financial problems.
Since
poorer
financial
health
companies experience financial problems,
it would seem that over production cannot
be enough to fulfill higher production costs.
In this case, management of poorer
financial health companies might perceive
REM as relatively costly (Abernathy et al.
2014). When companies of higher financial
health face lower financial problems, they
can carry out effective business activities
which can lead to high financial
performance (Opler and Titman 1994;
Garlappi and Yan 2011). Healthier
companies will take advantage of their
position with no financial problems to
increase future earnings by improving their
operational business to optimal level
through REM. In this case, REM is useful
in giving the signal of the company being
free of financial problems to perform
effective business activities and increase
future earnings.
H3: Financial
health
strengthens
(weakens) the positive (negative)
effect of REM on future earnings.

Research Framework
Research gaps show that previous
research (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin 2010;
Filip et al. 2015; Leggett et al. 2015; Vorst
2016; Tabassum et al. 2015; Gunny and
Zhang 2014; Subramanyam 1996; Siregar
and Utama 2009; Beyer et al. 2018) fail to
capture any contribution of cost of earnings
management as a determinant of opportunist versus efficient earnings management, nor any figure of it. The research
framework based on the literature and hypotheses development built can be seen on
Figure 1.
Based on the research framework, the
dependent variable is future earnings. The
independent variables are AEM and REM,
while moderating variables are auditor
quality, market share, and financial health.
Control variables are loss indicator,
company size and growth opportunity. Loss
indicator, company size, and growth opportunities are used to control if abnormal
activities came from the business condition
or indication of REM (Roychowdhury
2006). It is suspected that companies with
no negative earnings (no losses), of bigger
size, and higher growth opportunities
achieve higher earnings from normal
business activities due to their experience
in obtaining earnings (have no experience
with losses), larger resources (larger in
size), and in a growing condition (higher
growth opportunities) (Roychowdhury
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Tabel 1
Research Sample
Notes
Manufacturer companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange
2013-2015.
Changed the financial reporting period in the research period.
Financial statement is not available on www.idx.co.id or on the
company’s website.
Total

2006). Companies with experience in
losses, smaller resources (smaller in size),
and lower growth cannot generate higher
earnings from normal business activities, as
well as being suspected to engage in
abnormal business activities through REM.
Based on the above explanation, the loss
indicator is expected to have a negative
effect on future earnings, while size and
growth opportunity are expected to have
positive effects on future earnings (Gunny
2010; Muzir 2011; Liow 2010; Jennings et
al. 2015). Current earnings are added as a
control variable to address concern that
earnings management is correlated to
performance. Higher future earnings can be
achieved
because
companies
have
experience of higher current earnings
achievement. It is expected that current
earnings have a positive effect on future
earnings (Gunny 2010).
RESEARCH METHOD
Research Sample
The
research
sample
are
manufacturing companies listed on the
Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2013-2015.
This research determines the research
period to start from 2013 because free
access of complete financial statements on
the www.idx.co.id website or company
websites mostly began in 2013. This study
chooses manufacturing companies because
their characteristics are related to
production activities, so the measurement
of over production activities of REM will
not be biased. The number of the samples

Number of
Firms

Number of FirmYear

130
(2)

390
(6)

(3)

(9)

125

375

used in this research can be seen on Table
1.
Emprical Model
This research aims to examine the
moderating effect of the cost of earnings
management on the relationship between
earnings management and future earnings.
In order to fulfill the aims, this research
uses a moderating regression model as
follows:
Where AEM is Accrual Earnings
Management, REM is Real Earnings
Management, BIG refers to 1 if it is a Big
Four auditor and 0 if otherwise, MS is
Market Share, Z is Financial Health, LOSS
refers to 1 if the company experienced loss
and 0 if otherwise, SIZE is Company Size,
MVA is Market Value to Asset,
EARNINGS is Current Earnings.
In comparison, AEM is carried out at
the ending of the year, while REM is
implemented
throughout
the
year
(Roychowdhury 2006). Since companies
engage in REM from the beginning to the
end of the year, companies consider the
costs of REM (market share and financial
health) at the beginning of the year. Based
on this explanation, this research measures
market share at the beginning of period t
(MSt-1), while financial health is measured
at the beginning of period t (Zt-1).
Meanwhile, auditor quality (Big Four
affiliation) is measured at the period t
(BIGt) because AEM is carried out at the
end of the year. Control variables that
occurred are matched to the research period
(period t).
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Variable Measurements
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is future earnings. Future earnings occur in one year
ahead. Future earnings is measured by the
model according to Gunny (Gunny 2010).
Independent Variables
The independent variables are AEM
and REM. AEM is measured by discretionary accruals while REM is measured by
abnormal activities. This research assumes
that companies engage in both income
maximization AEM for bonus scheme and
debt covenant motivations (Scott 2019) and
income minimization AEM for political
cost motivation (Jones 1991; Scott 2019).
As for REM, this research follows the assumption by Roychowdhury (2006) that
explain that companies engage in income
maximization REM to avoid losses and
beat previous earnings target or analyst forecast. Since AEM is done both for income
maximization and minimization, this
research uses the absolute value of discretionary accruals. Regarding to REM, since
it is done for income maximization, positive or negative signs of abnormal activities
value matters to determine if companies
increase earnings by the practice of REM.
AEM is measured by absolute discretionary accrual of Jones (1991), modified
by Dechow et al. (1995), as follows.
Equation 3 will be run with cross section regression by using 1,602 firm-year

data of all non-banking and non-financial
companies listed on the Indonesian Stock
Exchange in 2013-2015. Banking and financial companies are excluded because
they are in a regulated industry and have
different industry characteristics among all
the industries. Parameters of a, b0, b1, b2
from Equation 3 are used to calculate nondiscretionary accruals, as follows.
REM is measured by abnormal activities. Activities that occur to detect REM
are sales manipulation, overproduction, and
discretionary expense cutting. In order to
estimate sales manipulation activity, overproduction, and discretionary expense
cutting, the equation that will be used is as
follows (Roychowdhury 2006).
Equations 6, 7, and 8 will be run with
cross section regression by using 1,602
firm-year data of all non-banking and nonfinancial companies listed on the
Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2013-2015.
Banking and financial companies are excluded because they are in a regulated
industry and have different industry characteristics among all the industries. In sales
manipulation activities, additional sales do
not generate an increase of operation cash
flow (Roychowdhury 2006). Based on
equation 6, when normal operation cash
flow that can be generated by sales (linear
function of sales and change of sales) is
higher than actual operation cash flow, then
abnormal (normal
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minus actual) operation cash flow will be
negative; this indicates that the compani is
engaged in sales manipulation.
In over production activities, companies produce more goods than expected
demand (Roychowdhury 2006). Based on
equation 7, when expected demand of
goods (linear function of sales, change of
sales, and previous change of sales) is lower than actual production, then abnormal
(expected minus actual) production will be
positive and indicates that companies are
engaged in over production.
In discretionary expense cutting activities, companies cut discretionary expenses when such expenses do not generate
immediate sales (Roychowdhury 2006).
Based on equation 8, when the sales that
can be generated (linear function of sales)
are higher than actual discretionary expenses, then the abnormal discretionary expenses will be negative, indicating that companies have cut discretionary expenses that
cannot generate immediate current sales.
Based on the above explanation, the
indication of REM is the negative value of
abnormal cash flow from operation (abnormal CFO), the positive value of abnormal production (abnormal PROD), and the
negative value of abnormal discretionary
expenses (abnormal DISEXP) (Cohen et al.
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2008). Abnormal CFO is the value of et
from equation (6). Abnormal PROD is the
value of et from equation (7). Abnormal
DISEXP is the value of et from equation
(8).
If the management of a company is
engaged with one type of REM activity,
then they will also be engaged in the other
type of REM activity (Cohen et al. 2008;
Chi et al. 2011). This research will use the
aggregate of three types of REM activities
as well as the comprehensive measurement
of REM. Real earnings management
occurred by the positive value of REM (Chi
et al. 2011) is as follows (Tabassum et al.
2014).
Moderating Variables
Moderating variables are auditor quality, market share, and financial health. Auditor quality is measured by a dummy
variable, scoring 1 if the auditor is
affiliated with the Big Four, and 0 if they
are affiliated with a non-Big Four.
The market share shows the position
and competition in the industry. Zang
(2012) stated that since REM is a departure
from optimal operational decisions, it can
be particularly costly for companies that
face in tense competition in the industry.
Therefore, a company with a lower
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percentage of industry market share may
perceive REM as more costly because it
can further erode their status within the industry (Abernathy et al. 2014). Market
share is calculated by the total sales of the
company divided by the total sales of the
industry group (within three digits of industry code) at the beginning of the period
(Abernathy et al. 2014; Zang 2012). In this
research, the industry group is based on the
three digit code of JASICA (Jakarta Stock
Industrial Classification) of the manufacturing industry.
For a company in poor financial
health, the marginal cost of deviating from
optimal business strategies is likely to be
high (Zang 2012). In this case, management might perceive real activities manipulation as relatively costly because their
primary goal is to improve operations
(Abernathy et al. 2014). Financial health is
measured by the z score of Altman (1968)
at the beginning of the period. Matturungan
et al. (2017) state that the z score of Altman
(1968) has the prediction power of evaluating the financial distress of Indonesian
manufacturing companies 87.8 percent (includes in good category). It shows that this
research could use the z score of Altman
(1968) to measure financial health. The
higher the z score, the healthier the company is. The Z score of Altman (1968) is as
follows.
Control Variables
The control variables are loss indicator, size, growth opportunity, and current
earnings. Loss indicator, size, and growth
opportunities are used to control whether
abnormal activities came from business
conditions or an indication of real earnings
management, while current earnings used
to address concern of earnings management
is related to performance (Roychowdhury
2006). The loss indicator is measured by a
dummy variable, given a score of 1 if earnings have a negative value, and a score of
0 if earnings have a positive value. Size is
measured by the logarithm of total assets.
Growth opportunity is measured by the
market value of equity divided by total

assets. Current earnings are measured by
the earnings after tax divided by total
assets. The loss indicator has a negative
effect on future earnings, while growth opportunity and current earnings have the positive effects on future earnings (Gunny
2010; Muzir 2011; Liow 2010). A larger
size shows a larger resource to generate
future earnings (Jennings et al. 2015).
Analysis Method
This research uses data from a
financial statement published on the
Indonesian Stock Exchange. Data was
analyzed by regression with panel data
(multi samples and years). This research
chooses the best model of panel regression
among common, fixed, or random effect
with the redundant fixed effect test and
Hausman test.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows that based on 375
firm-year data, the highest future earnings
is 0.737, while the lowest is -1.279. The
highest current earnings is 2.540, while the
lowest is -0.603. The negative value of
earnings indicates that this research
involves loss companies. The consideration
of the involvement of loss companies is to
control the possibility of opportunist
earnings management to delay negative
reported earnings in the current period
(Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 2010) that
give consequences of the existence of
negative earnings in the future period
(Gunny 2010). The sample of loss
companies are 76 firm-years or 20.3
percent of all 375 firm-years. The average
of future earnings for each firm-year is
0.035 with a deviation from the average of
0.126.
The average of AEM is 0.086, which
means that on average manufacturing
companies manage their level of earnings
0.086 higher or lower from actual earnings
relative to lagged total assets by using
accounting choices policy and estimation.
The average of REM is 0.022, which means
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Empirical Model Variables
Mean
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Firm-year
Loss Firm-year

Future Earnings
0.035
0.737
-1.279
0.126
5.325
375

AEM
0.086
2.544
0.000
0.165
9.782
375

REM
0.022
1.142
-2.336
0.472
-1.698
375

MS
0.143
1.000
0.000
0.210
1.985
375

Z
6.333
832.277
-14.184
43.119
18.820
375

Profit Firm-year

SIZE
12.289
14.390
10.561
0.693
0.494
375

MVA
1.603
142.568
0.000
7.588
14.443
375

Current Earnings
0.057
2.540
-0.603
0.183
7.239
375
76
(20.3% of total firm-year)
299
(79.7% of total firm-year)

Table 3
Selection Model Tests
Test
Redundant fixed
effect
Hausman

Significance
0.0003
0.0000

Notes
Fixed effect model is better than the common effect
model
Fixed effect model is better than the random effect
model

that average manufacturing companies
manage their level of earnings 0.022 higher
from actual earnings relative to lagged total
assets by engaging in sales manipulation,
over-production, and discretionary expense
cutting. Based on the Leuz et al. (2003)
report that examined non-banking and
financing companies in 31 countries from
1990-1999, Indonesia is included in the
cluster of 10 countries with a high average
of earnings management. This indicates
that Indonesia has high a potential of
engaging in both AEM and REM.
The average market share is 0.143,
which means that average manufacturing
companies have about 14.3 percent control
of market share of the industry. The
average Z score is 6.333. Altman (1968)
determines healthy companies of having a
Z score above 2.99 and poor companies
having a Z score below 1.83, the average Z
score shows that the average manufacture
companies are healthy. This research uses
the health condition based on Altman
(1968) because Matturungan et al. (2017)
found that the Altman (1968) Z score has
87.8 percent (includes in good category)
explanatory
power
of
bankruptcy
prediction for Indonesian manufacturing
companies.

Conclusion
Fixed effect
model is the best
model

Regression Model Selection
This research uses panel data. There
are three regression models provided to
analyze panel data, namely the common
effect, fixed effect, and random effect
model. In order to choose the best model,
this study used the redundant fixed effect
test and Hausman test. The result of the
redundant fixed effect test and Hausman
test can be viewed on Table 3.
Table 3 shows that the significance
value of the redundant fixed effect test is
0.0003 (significant in level 0.01). This
indicates that the fixed effect model is
better than the common effect model. The
significance value of the Hausman test is
0.0000 (significant in level 0.01). This
indicates that the fixed effect model is
superior to the random effect model. This
research uses fixed effect regression for
hypotheses testing.
Multicollinearity Test
A multicollinearity test is used to
evaluate
the
correlation
between
independent variables. Hartono (2014)
explains that there might be a
multicollinearity problem in moderating
regression models since the model involves
interaction between independent and
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Table 4
Result of Multicollinearity Test
Independent Variables
AEM
REM
Interaction between auditor quality and AEM
Interaction between market share and REM
Interaction between financial health and REM
Auditor quality
Market Share
Financial Health
Loss indicator
Size
Market value to total assets
Current Earnings

moderating
variables.
The
multicollinearity test is done through the VIF
test. The result of the multicollinearity test
can be seen on Table 4.
Based on Table 4, the VIF of all
independent variables is below 10. This
shows that this research is free of
multicollinearity problems.
Hypotheses Test and Discussion
Based on Table 5 showing the results
of regression without moderating variables,
AEM has a coefficient value of 0.350525
(statistically significant at 0.01); meaning
that AEM has a positive effect on future
earnings. This is consistent with Siregar
and Utama (2009) who found that
discretionary accruals (the proxy of AEM)
in the Indonesian Stock Exchange are used
to predict future earnings. From an efficient
earnings management perspective, AEM is
used as a tool to give a signal of private
information.
Results of regression without
moderating variables show that REM has a
coefficient value of -0.000008 (statistically
insignificant), which means that REM has
no effect on future earnings. Previous
research gaps (e.g. Gunny and Zhang 2014;
Beyer et al. 2018; Cohen and Zarowin
2010; Filip et al. 2015; Leggett et al. 2015;
Vorst 2016) have shown the inconsistent
effect of REM on future earnings, REM
without the interaction with market share
and financial health cannot be determined
either as opportunist or efficient REM to

VIF
3.657711
3.052870
2.220299
2.215931
2.99899
2.261539
1.641242
1.79391
1.561904
1.739295
3.116300
4.496015

predict future earnings. The effect of REM
on future earnings is clearly explained
when REM interacts with market share and
financial health.
Results of regression with moderating
variables show that the variable interaction
between auditor quality and AEM
(BIGxAEM) has a coefficient value of
0.312008 (statistically significant at the
level of 0.05). This indicates that
Hypothesis 1 is accepted. Since AEM has a
positive effect on future earnings, high
quality auditors (auditors from the Big
Four) strengthens the positive effect of
AEM on future earnings compared to low
quality auditors from non-Big Four firms.
Big Four auditors need to maintain their
reputation in front of the investor by
ensuring that the manager uses AEM to
provide private information to the investor.
Ojo (2015) states that investors rely on
auditors as an independent party to ensure
high information quality. Therefore, Big
Four auditors strengthen the positive effect
of AEM on future earnings because AEM
that can predict future earnings is positively
responded by the investor, resulting in
interest from the auditor. This result is
consistent with Mascarenhas et al. (2010)
and Zehri and Shabou (2011) that state high
quality auditors tend to decrease
opportunist AEM that reduce future
earnings and increase signaling AEM that
predict future earnings. Al-Attar et al.
(2008) argue that accruals management is
not always as noise, but can predict

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Desember 2019, Vol. 16, No. 2, hal 141-164

157

Table 5
Result of Hypotheses Test
Prediction
Sign

AEM
REM
BIGxAEM

+/+/+

Coefficient
Without
With
Moderating
Moderating
Variables
Variables
0.350525*
0.245049**
-0.000008
0.013039
0.312008**

MSxREM

+

0.013850**

ZxREM

+

0.002098**

BIG
MS
Z
LOSS
SIZE
MVA
EARNINGS
Constant
F-Statistic
Adjusted R-Squared
*Significant in level 0.01
**Significant in level 0.05

+
+
+
+
+
+

0.030578
0.027429
0.000605
0.021203
-0.110983
-0.007191
0.052842**
1.347062
4.624448*
0.568590

0.012801
-0.103944
-0.003562
0.043691**
1.285689
4.793524*
0.569406

future performance as well. The role of an
auditor is to increase future earnings by
reducing monitoring cost spending by
companies (Ching et al. 2015). For
example, a high quality auditor will suggest
doubtful allowance estimation that reflects
good collection management and customer
payment
profile.
Good
collection
management and customer payment profile
are competitive advantages to increase
revenue and earnings in the future.
The variable interaction between
market share and REM (MSxREM) has a
coefficient value of 0.013850 (statistically
significant at the level of 0.05). This
indicates that Hypothesis 2 is accepted.
Results of the effect of REM on future
earnings shows that REM has a negative
coefficient, therefore higher market share
weakens the negative effect of REM on
future earnings compared to lower market
share. Since REM is carried out by
performing abnormal operation activities,
there is potential lost, such as the potential
of sales decreasing in the future when
companies return to perform normal
operational activities. Companies with a

Notes

H1 is supported by the
data
H2 is supported by the
data
H3 is supported by the
data

higher market share can reduce the
potential loss because they have a strong
position in the market; in the context of the
efficient contract, this can also be seen as
REM used to give the signal of the position
of companies in the market. Market share
can reduce future loss through the use of
REM; therefore higher market share
weakens the negative effect of REM on
future earnings. This result is consistent
with Gunny (2010) that states REM is a
strategy to show competitive advantages
and the ability to generate better
profitability in the future. In this case,
market share is a competitive advantage
that can increase performance (Opler and
Titman 1994). Markarian and Santalo
(2014) state that a company with no strong
market position in the industry tends to
manage earnings opportunistically; on the
other hand, Abernathy et al. (2014) and
Zang (2012) state that a company with a
strong market position that implements
REM will improve business activities. For
example, a company that carries out over
sales by giving discount prices will not lose
future sales when returning to the standard
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Table 6
Additional Test

AEM
REM
BIGxAEM
MSxREM
ZxREM
BIG
MS
Z
LOSS
SIZE
MVA
EARNINGS
Constant
VIF
Fixed-Effect
F-Statistic
Adjusted R-Squared
*Significant in level 0.01
**Significant in level 0.05
***Significant in level 0.10

REM = -Abnormal
CFO

Coefficient
REM = +Abnormal
Production

0.258119*
0.088441
0.347422**
0.264723*
0.000965
0.022656
-0.003070
0.000996***
0.021669
-0.091920
-0.005605
0.042108**
1.112855
Below 10
Yes
4.726352*
0.575378

0.242778*
0.011277
0.316863**
-0.427412
0.018352**
0.034757
0.194588
-3.91E-05
0.019091
-0.112946
-0.006439
0.050769**
1.350418
Below 10
Yes
4.691871*
0.573105

price (before the discounted price) in the
future because its high market share
maintains high sales for the company.
The variable interaction between
financial health and REM (ZxREM) has a
coefficient value of 0.002098 (statistically
significant at the level of 0.05). This
indicates that Hypothesis 3 is accepted.
Results of the effect of REM on future
earnings show that REM has a negative
coefficient, so higher financial health
weakens the negative effect of REM on
future earnings compared to lower financial
health. When companies engage in REM,
they perform abnormal activities above
their normal level. This will be followed by
potential loss because more abnormal
levels of resources are needed to perform
abnormal activities, such as financial
difficulties after overproduction because a
company requires a large number of
resources to carry out overproduction and
has to be financially funded. Furthermore,
financial difficulties also make companies
struggle to generate earnings. Companies

REM = -Abnormal
Discretionary
Expenses
0.252464*
0.203078
0.297154**
0.190226*
8.57E-05
0.025953
0.005018
6.96E-05
0.022226
-0.107076
-0.006320
0.046592**
1.305916
Below 10
Yes
4.652743*
0.570497

with higher financial health can reduce the
potential of financial difficulties because of
good financial conditions; whereas in the
context of the efficient contract, it can also
be seen as REM that is used to give the
signal of financial health condition. A good
financial condition can reduce financial
difficulties which can make companies
struggle to generate earnings; therefore
financial health weakens the negative effect
of REM on future earnings. This result is
consistent with Gunny (2010) that states
REM is a strategy to show competitive
advantage and the ability to generate better
profitability in the future. In this case,
financial health is a competitive advantage
that can increases performance (Opler and
Titman 1994). Fisher et al. (2016) state that
a company tends to manage earnings
opportunistically to avoid a bankruptcy
filing, while Abernathy et al. (2014) and
Zang (2012) argue that a healthy company
that does REM will improve business
activities. For example, a company that
undergoes
overproduction
will
not
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experience financial difficulties as an
impact of big operational investment for
overproduction.
Additional Test
This research runs an additional test
to analyze each REM activity with
information signaling to increase future
earnings. In the context of signaling, one
activity gives a different information
content compared to the other, as well as
giving different signals (eg. Connelly
2011). Over sales activity (level of abnormal CFO), overproduction activity
(level of +abnormal production cost), and
discretionary expense cutting activity (level
of abnormal discretionary expenses) are
examined partially to show if different
REM activities explain different signals of
competitive advantage in order to increase
future earnings.
Table 6 shows that interaction
between market share and over sales
activities had a positive effect on future
earnings, while the interaction between
financial health and over sales had no
effect on it. Zang (2012) explains that
higher market share companies have
competitive advantages such as greater
cumulative experience, the ability to benefit
from economies of scale, bargaining power
with suppliers and customers, attention
from investors, and influence on their
competitors. Over sales activities which
were done by higher market share companies are more likely to communicate
information about competitive advantages
in their market position to increase future
earnings, while over sales activities done
by higher financial health companies do not
communicate information about their
healthy financial condition. For example,
higher market share companies provide
lenient credit sales (over sales activities) to
give signal that they have advantages of
greater experience and bargaining power
with customers.
The interaction between market share
and overproduction activities had no effect
on future earnings, while the interaction
between financial health and over-
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production had a positive effect on future
earnings. Higher financial health shows
that companies have lower financial
problems and are in a healthy financial
condition. Overproduction activities done
by higher financial health companies are
more likely to communicate information
about healthy financial conditions and
lower financial problems so they can
increase future earnings, while overproduction activities
done by higher
market share companies do not communicate information about competitive
advantages of market position. For
example, higher financial health companies
carry out overproduction to give signal that
they have no financial problems to cover up
the increase of production costs.
The interaction between market share
and discretionary expense cutting activities
has a positive effect on future earnings,
while the interaction between financial
health and discretionary expense cutting
has no effect on future earnings. Zang
(2012) explains that higher market share
companies have competitive advantages
such as greater cumulative experience, the
ability to benefit from economies of scale,
bargaining power with suppliers and
customers, attention from investors, and
influence on their competitors. Discretionary expense cutting activities done by
higher market share companies are more
likely to communicate information about it
while discretionary expenses cutting
activities done by higher financial health
companies do not communicate information on healthy financial conditions. For
example, higher market share companies
cut advertisement expenses to give signal
that they have advantages of greater
experience, economics of scale, and
bargaining power with customers to make
customers buy their products without any
advertisement, as well as being able to
increase future earnings. Connelly (2011)
argues that different activities give different
signals, companies engaged in different
REM activities will give different signals
of the company’s competitive advantages
to increase future earnings.
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CONCLUSION
Based on data analysis, results show
that auditor quality strengthens the positive
effect of AEM on future earnings. This
indicates that a high quality auditor is more
likely to increase efficient AEM to give the
signal of private information than opportunist AEM to predict future earnings.
Market share weakens the negative effect
of REM on future earnings. This indicates
that a company with a higher market share
is more likely to engage in efficient REM
than opportunist REM to increase future
performance. Financial health weakens the
negative effect of REM on future earnings,
indicating that a healthier company is more
likely to engage in efficient REM than
opportunist REM to increase future performance. The cost of earnings management is
explained if earnings management is done
opportunistically or with efficient contract
motivation.
There are some limitations to this
research. First, this research does not
consider analyst forecast of future earnings
due to limited access to analyst forecast
data, because earnings management can be
used to beat analyst forecasts, either for
opportunistic (eg. Vorst 2016) or efficient
motivation (eg. Gunny 2010; Beyer et al.
2018). Second, this research has limitations
on the variable measurements, such as
earnings management was only measured
by discretionary accruals and abnormal
activities and is estimated by the company
data of this research sample only, while
there are other measurements of earnings
management such as income smoothing
(eg. Eckel 1981) or classification shifting
(McVay 2006). Market share was measured
based on companies listed on the
Indonesian Stock Exchange only, which
does not reflect true market share compared
to other unlisted companies. Third, this
study only utilized manufacturing companies as the research sample, thus the results
cannot be generalized to use on nonmanufacturing companies. Fourth, this
research uses future earnings for only one
year ahead and does not consider long run

future earnings of two or three years ahead.
Fifth, this research does not consider
downward REM for income minimization,
where Francis et al. (2016) finds the
existence of downward REM when there is
managerial incentive for share repurchase,
management buyouts, and CEO option
awards. Future research suggestions include: considering the analyst forecast of
future earnings to ensure companies are
engaged in earnings management for
analyst forecast beating purposes, using
other measurements of earnings management, considering unlisted companies’
sales to measure true market share, using
non-manufacturing companies as research
samples, using earnings two or three years
ahead to measure long run future earnings,
and examining the downward REM for
income minimization, especially in cases of
share repurchase, management buyouts,
and CEO option awards.
These research findings have a
number of implications. For academicians,
this research fills the previous research gap
by providing auditor quality, market share,
and financial health factors to determine if
earnings management is done based as an
opportunist act or efficient contract purpose. Companies can also consider high
quality auditors, market share, and financial
health to give signal of better future
earnings by using earnings management.
Where investors are concerned, they can
evaluate auditor quality, market share, and
financial health to use earnings information
for investment decision making.
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